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UNIVERSAL BANKS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN GERMANY
Theodor Baums*
I. Introduction
Universal banking means that banks are permitted to offer all of the various kinds of
financial services. This includes classical banking activities like the credit and deposit
business, as well as investment services, placement and brokerage of securities, and even
insurance activities, trading in real estate and others. German universal banks also hold
stock in nonfinancial firms and offer to vote their clients' shares in other firms.
1 This paper
deals with universal banks and their role in the investment business, more specifically, their
links with investment companies and their various roles as shareholders and providers of
financial services to such companies. Banks and investment companies have, as financial
intermediaries, one trait in common: they both transform capital of investors (depositors
and shareholders of investment funds, respectively) into funds (loans and equity or debt
securities, respectively) that are channeled to other firms. So why should a regulation
forbid to combine these transformation tasks in one institution or group, and why should
the law not allow banks to establish investment companies and provide all kinds of
financial services to them in addition to their banking services? German banking and
investment company law have answered these questions in the affirmative. This paper
argues that the existing regulation is not a sound and recommendable one.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections II - V identify four areas where the
combination of banking and investment might either harm the shareholders of the
investment funds and/or negatively affect other constituencies such as the shareholders of
the banking institution. These sections will at the same time explore whether there are
institutional or regulatory provisions in place or market forces at work that adequately
protect investors and the other constituencies in question. Concluding remarks follow
(VI.).3
II. Banks as Shareholders and Trustees
This section deals with the principal-agent relationship between investors and investment
companies and the concurrent roles of banks as shareholders in investment companies and
as trustees of the investors under German law.
1. The separation between shareholders and investors under German law
One basic structural difference between a mutual fund under the U.S. Investment Company
Act of 1940 and an investment company under German law is crucial for understanding of
the role of the banks both as shareholders and providers of various kinds of services to
investment companies: contrary to a U.S.-style mutual fund, German investors are not
shareholders of the investment company. The shareholder(s) of an investment company
and the "shareholders" of the investment funds that are set up and run by such a company
have to be clearly distinguished. German investment companies are corporations
2 whose
shares are mostly
3 held either by one single bank or a majority of their shares is held by one
or several banks. The "shareholders" of the funds, or investors, however, are not
shareholders of the investment company. Rather, the investment fund is a pool of assets
(securities, real estate) financed by the investors and administered, similar in form to a
trust, by the investment company. The investment fund is, other than the administering
investment company, not a legal entity. Each of the investors is linked with the investment
company by an indenture that spells out the fundamental investment policies and the
management fees that are paid to the company, and describes the rights of the investor vis-
à-vis the company and the interest he holds in the fund.
2. Contractual vs. corporate governance structure
As a consequence, the governance structure and governance problems of American-style
mutual funds and German-style investment funds look quite different.4
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When an investment company is organized as a corporation with its investors as its
shareholders, management is obliged to pursue solely and exclusively the investors’
interests. Of course, even in such a setting there will be monitoring problems and specific
costs for the investor-shareholders because of the separation of ownership and
management,
4 problems that will be exacerbated to the extent that the shares are widely
distributed among small shareholders.
5 But the duties of the board and management vis-à-
vis the investor-shareholders are clear and undivided.
That is not the case in a structure where the investors and the shareholders of an
investment company are different groups. On the one hand such an investment company is
obliged to pursue the investors’ interests, on the other hand management must maximize
the value of  shareholder’s shares and follow their instructions.
6 Being parties to an
investment contract rather than shareholders, investors cannot give such instructions to the
investment company or its management, cannot vote on corporate or investment matters
or even dismiss management if they are dissatisfied. There are then only two ways left to
protect the interests of the investors in such a setting:
First, investors could be given an exit option: the right to a repurchase of the investment
certificates by the company. Investors could then "exit" rather than vote
7 if they are
dissatisfied with management. Given the costs that are connected with  monitoring by
voting - information gathering, costs of collective action, costs because of remaining
agency problems - the exit option seems to be a superior solution. German investment law
provides for such a right of exit.
8
However, exit comes at a cost and might not be a realistic option under specific
circumstances. Following the "Wall Street Rule" and choosing another investment imposes
transaction costs on the investor. There may also be barriers to exit because of high loads
or fees.
9 And the exit option will only be exercised if the investor has information about
bad performance of the fund compared to its competitors or to a benchmark. There is,
however, no useful and reliable assessment of the value of investment certificates and the
performance of the funds so far. German investment securities are not listed on a stock
exchange. Their value is not assessed by the market. They are bought and sold on the basis
of a valuation by the depositary bank (which is identical with the parent bank). This
valuation does, at least to a certain extent, say something about the past performance of
the fund and the quality of the funds’ management and its decisions. This information,6
however, is "hidden": the investor does not know whether the price development of his
share follows the market, or whether his fund has out- or underperformed the market in
the past
10. Most "performance comparisons" for publicly held funds ("Publikumsfonds")
reported in the media are simply based on a comparison of the developments of the prices
of the various shares fixed by the deposit banks;
11 sometimes the riskiness of a share is also
calculated.
12
A mere exit option has still another shortcoming. If investment certificates are dispersed
and widely held, and if there is no voting mechanism with a majority rule, then it will be
almost impossible to change the conditions of the investment contract, adopt a new policy,
alter the administration fees, and so on. Adaptation to new circumstances is made
impossible. In such a system investment companies will anticipate this and offer conditions
from the beginning (like broad phrasing of permissible investment policies etc.) that might
be disadvantageous to the investors, at least as long as competitive forces and the
development of informational intermediaries do not exclude this.
Consequently, German investment law does not rely exclusively on the exit option. The
Investment Company Act permits the investment company itself to make one-sided
alterations to the indenture where necessary,
13 provided that the alteration complies with
any applicable mandatory provisions of the law
14, the Federal Banking Supervisory
Authority
15 finds that the interests of the investors have been sufficiently preserved, and
the alteration is published. To the problems of monitoring the investment company’s
management and controlling whether it complies with the provisions of the contract, acts
with due loyalty and care, and performs well, the Investment Company Act has found a
special solution: It does not - as one might expect - consider the links of the management
and the investment company with its owners (mostly a bank) as a possible source of
conflicts of interests vis-à-vis the investors. On the contrary, the Investment Company Act
even puts the bank and the company’s supervisory board into action as a means of
monitoring management in lieu and on behalf of the investors as the following section will
show.
3. Supervisory boards and owner-banks as trustees7
The managers of an investment company are appointed and dismissed by the shareholding
institution (bank or other).
16 The same is true for the members of the supervisory board to
the extent that they are not elected by the employees of the company.
17 The supervisory
board must monitor management and must be asked for its consent to defined major
transactions.
18 In order to make sure that the interests of the investors are preserved, the
Investment Company Act provides that the "personality and expert knowledge" of the
members of the supervisory board guarantee that the interests of the investors be
ensured.
19 That does not, however, preclude - according to the opinion of legal
commentators and the practice of the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority - a member
of the supervisory board of an investment company which is a subsidiary of a bank from
serving on the management board of the owner-bank at the same time
20. Hence, in
practice, the majority of the members of the "Aufsichtsrat" of an investment company will
be managers of the owner-bank(s) at the same time.
21
The model contract for so-called "Spezialfonds" (a special form which is available for
institutional investors only) provides for an additional investment advisory council
("Anlageausschuß") where at least some of the members are appointed by the investors
themselves.
22 But the model contract for retail or public investment funds ("Publikums-
fonds") does not provide such a representation of the investors’ interests.
23
Apart from these attempts to promote and enforce investor-orientated policy and behavior
by the fund’s management, the Investment Company Act provides particular investor
protection by conferring special tasks in this regard upon a depositary bank. This
depositary bank must not only keep a fund’s securities in safe custody, cash in dividends,
etc., but is also vested with specific powers to protect the investors’ interests. It must,
inter alia, guarantee that the investment company does not overcharge the fund with
unjustified fees and expenses.
24 It has the right to assert claims on behalf of the investors
by legal action.
25 In case of insolvency of the investment company it has the right to cancel
the investment contract between the investors and the company.
26 Under certain
circumstances it has the right and the duty to liquidate the fund.
27 In fulfilling these tasks it
must act independently and only in the interest of the investors.
28 Neither the Investment
Company Act nor the Banking Supervisory Authority, however, exclude a parent bank
that owns an investment company from serving itself as the investment company’s8
depositary institution at the same time. Hence that is always the regular case in practice.
29 I
need not explain further that the idea of allowing the owner of a company to serve also as
the overseer of the company on behalf of the company’s counterparties is flawed.
30 It is as
flawed as the complementary provision of the Investment Company Act that the
(subsidiary) company oversee its (parent) depositary bank’s fulfillment of its tasks.
31
The initial idea behind the provision that the parent bank act as trustee on behalf of the
investors was probably to profit from the bank’s reputation. The next section deals with
the question whether this and/or more vigorous competition will provide for effective
control of the investment company on behalf of the investors.
4. Reputation and performance measurement as substitutes?
It has already been mentioned that there is still no satisfactory and reliable performance
measurement of the German "Publikumsfonds", nor any continuous performance
information for the investing public.
32 Hence there have been always considerable
informational problems for the investors before the conclusion of an investment contract.
For new independent investment companies it would therefore have been particularly
difficult to build up a reputation as good performers on their own. In order to offset this
the established banks lent and still do lend their own reputation to their affiliated
investment companies. A similar consideration applies to problems that might arise after
the conclusion of an investment contract: the reputation of the banks was and still is
considered as a certain guarantee against detrimental actions of an incompetent, low-
performing or even criminal management.
It must not be ignored, however, that the parent bank stands on the side of the investors’
counterparties. In the principal-agent relationship between investors and investment
company the depositary bank belongs to the agent’s side if it is affiliated with the
investment company as its parent. There is a natural conflict of interests between the
parent bank and the investors. The parent bank cannot credibly serve as an independent
monitor of its investment company’s management on behalf of the investors in such
instances in which the interests of the bank and the investors might diverge. The reputation9
of the bank may not necessarily be impaired by actions against the interests of the investors
because, perhaps the investors will not detect such an action. Investors will therefore react
negatively to their partial lack of efficient control.
An improvement of the measurement of the (past) performance of the funds’ managers
certainly will provide for more vigorous competition and put a tighter rein on investment
companies and their managers. But good performance in the past is not a guarantee against
agency problems that might arise once the investment contract is concluded.
To sum up, a change in the existing regulation, e.g., to take the position of trustee of the
investors away from parent banks of investment companies and to provide for more
effective and flexible control of the investment companies on behalf of the investors, is not
superfluous because the parent bank's reputation might be at stake, and it will not be made
unnecessary by market forces unleashed by increased competition.
5. Publicly held funds and the collective action problem
Any proposals for how to shape the "principal-agent" relationship between the investors
and the investment company and its parent bank must consider the "market split," the
difference between publicly held funds ("Publikumsfonds") and the special funds
("Spezialfonds"). Spezialfonds are reserved to institutional investors and may have no
more than ten shareholders.
33 Agency problems and most of the problems discussed later
in this paper will be less severe in Spezialfonds as their investors usually are sophisticated
investors with large or even single shareholdings.
34 One characteristic trait of these
Spezialfonds is that typically there will be an advisory board established that consists of
representatives of the investor(s) and has a decisive influence on investment decisions.
35
There is also a separate private performance measurement company that sells its services
almost exclusively to Spezialfonds and their investors
36 whereas performance measurement
of the Publikumsfonds is much less developed.
37 This structure means, however, that in
fact there exist two different markets for investment certificates: one market where
certificates are sold to institutional investors only, and where private investors - the public
- do not have access. Beside this market there exists a second and smaller(!)
38 market for10
investment shares in "Publikumsfonds". More than 80% of these shares are held by private
investors, less than 20% by institutions (insurance companies, banks and others).
39 The
consequence of this split into two different markets with two different groups of investors
is that the institutional investors do not stand by to protect the interests of the small
investors who otherwise could "free-ride" on the discipline imposed by the institutions.
III. Affiliated transactions
1. Scope
The role of universal banks in German investment company law and practice is not
confined to positions as owners of such companies. They also serve, as has been shown, as
trustees of the investors. In addition they offer and sell all kinds of financial services to
investment companies:
- They keep the funds’ securities and other assets in safe custody and administer
them (cash-in dividends; deliver the assets to the purchaser in the event of a sale etc.);
40
- They sell and purchase the funds’ assets (securities) on behalf of the investment
company with the right of adopting these transactions for themselves;
41
- They sell and repurchase the investment certificates to and from the investors on
behalf of the investment company;
42
- As German investment certificates are not listed and traded on an exchange, the
depositary banks are obliged to calculate and fix the sale and repurchase price of these
securities daily;
43
- They distribute dividends to the investors;
44
- They pay administration fees to the investment companies.
45
2. Conflicts of interest and regulatory provisions11
Given the fact that the predominant owner-bank will be chosen as depositary bank by its
investment company’s management, there seems to be considerable potential for conflicts
of interest and abuse of the investors unless market forces or legal provisions prevent it.
46
There is, for instance, incentive for "churning" if the bank receives a brokerage fee and this
practice is not limited by, e.g., an appropriate provision in the investment contract. The
fact that investment securities are not listed and traded on an exchange forces the
consumers to buy them through the banks, thus guaranteeing fees to the banks
47. At the
same time this system forgoes the chance to let the market rather than one single interested
institution assess the value of the investment product.
Finally - connected with this - there is an incentive to ask for non-competitive high fees for
the bank’s services to the investment company. As a subsidiary, the investment company
and its management are not free to choose another institution as depositary. Factually, the
depositary bank and the investment company have an exclusive commitment. The
Investment Company Act tries to counterbalance the investment company’s lack of
freedom of action by requiring that the terms and conditions of the investment contract be
approved by the Banking Supervisory Authority.
48 This approval must be refused if the
contract does not fix the methods, the (maximum) amount, and the calculation of the
depositary bank’s fees.
49 But that will, of course, provide only for a certain disclosure
50 of
the fees that the bank charges, not for competitive prices.
To conclude, there is no pressure on a parent bank’s fees from the side of its counterparty,
the investment company, because of their common ownership.
That needs not to mean, however, that business links between a parent bank and its
subsidiary investment company should be cut completely. Rather, one could argue that the
bank and its investment company should be considered as one entity. This entity produces
and sells its products, i.e. shares in investment funds, to the public. Whether or not the
bank overcharges its subsidiary does not matter as long as there is effective intergroup
competition in the market for investment securities. If that is the case, a regulation should
not try to enforce independence of a subsidiary by prohibiting its parent bank from offering
financial services to the subsidiary. There is no reason to prescribe for (financial) firms12
how they should be organized and whether they should produce products completely intra-
group or buy parts of it in the market.
The problem with this argument, however, is that it does not take into consideration the
complexity of the investment product, the limited information available to the investors,
and the investors’ limited rationality. If the amount of the fees charged by the depositary
bank is not fixed precisely before an investment contract is concluded, the investment fund
may be charged uncompetitive high prices later. Even if a maximum amount is agreed
upon and disclosed in the investment contract (usually: in ‰ of the "value" at the end of
each month, as calculated by the depositary bank), a comparison with other investment
products and their various specific traits by the single investor is very difficult (and costly).
An integration of future fees that could possibly be charged into the current share prices by
the market could be a true and satisfactory substitute for a prohibition of affiliated
transactions between a parent bank and its affiliated investment company. Another way
would be to establish outside boards with truly independent representatives of the
investors and have the investment fund managers to ask the board for its consent to
transactions with the parent bank.
IV. Other business interests of the parent bank
Apart from the banks’ direct business links with their affiliated investment companies, the
banks also have links with third parties that might detrimentally influence a fund’s policy
and its investors. There might, for instance, be incentive to ask the fund managers to
support a debtor firm of the bank by, say, acquiring its securities or by buying real estate
from it. The following section tries to track the coordination of a fund’s investment
policies with its owner-bank’s interests in two instances: first, the owner-bank is
underwriter of a share issue (1.); second, the owner-bank holds shares of another firm on
its own account (2.). Does this influence the subsidiary fund’s investment policy, and if so,
how?
1. Underwriting and investment policy13
The following figures show initial public offerings of shares in 1991 and 1992, their
principal underwriters, and the extent to which their investment company subsidiaries
("Publikumsfonds") bought these shares in the following period.24
So far these figures do not give more than a first impression. They will have to be
extended over several years, will have to include other banks and their subsidiaries as well,
and will have to integrate bond issues and stock issues of already listed companies.
Interestingly, figures 2-9 show one investment pattern: in all cases where the parent bank
was principal underwriter, its subsidiary investment funds bought more shares of the new
issue than other funds. That, of course, does not yet say anything about the quality of this
investment decision. The subsidiary may have profitted from better information on the firm
and its outlook ("good decision"). Or the parent bank may have "dumped its trash" on its
subsidiary or simply used its subsidiary to support the market for these securities ("bad
decision"). It is hard to find out whether the investment decisions of the subsidiaries’ fund
managers were good or bad given that the available data are  not sufficient to fix the
purchase and selling dates exactly and check the development of the price movement
around these dates.
In any event, the mere possibility of "dumping the trash" might deter investors or lead to
additional risk premiums if there are neither appropriate regulatory nor market forces at
work.
The above figures certainly prove that there is no industry-wide policy for investment
companies not to invest in securities where the parent bank has acted as underwriter. Of
course the investment bank, its managers, as well as the depositary bank would breach
their legal duties if they acted against the interests of the investors.
51 Both the investment
company and the depositary bank could sue each other on behalf of the investors.
52 The
investors could sue both companies in such a case,
53 and the Banking Supervisory
Authority could act as well. There are, however, practical problems in implementing these
sanctions: first, it is difficult to discover any connection between underwriting and
investment decision and, second, even if the stock price had crashed before and after the
purchase, the question has to be answered whether the investment decision was beyond
any reasonable business judgement.25
Here again the question arises whether such practices should be forbidden completely or
whether market forces can and do restrain such practices. As prices are fixed by the parent
(depositary) bank
54 and not by the market (an exchange), the cost of a possible later "bad
decision" is not integrated into the price the investor pays. Therefore investors could be
damaged ex post if they are not aware of this from the beginning and refrain from buying
shares in such funds. If a valuation by the market (an exchange) did exist, investment firms
could deliberately adopt a policy not to invest in securities that are underwritten by the
parent bank. One could even imagine a binding disclosure rule obligating an investment
fund to disclose the fund’s investment policy in this respect. A legal prohibition would be
unnecessary then, provided that this investment security is listed on an exchange and
valued by the market. An alternative would be to establish outside boards with
independent representatives of the investors who would have to decide on such
transactions.
2. Shareholdings of banks and investment policy
Similar considerations apply as we turn to shareholding by the parent banks on their own
accounts, and its possible influence on investment decisions of their subsidiaries. There are
three principal incentives for a bank to ask its subsidiary’s management to invest in shares
of a firm in which the parent bank holds a stake itself. The first reason is related to the
underwriting case: the parent bank might wish to get rid of a part of its own shares. In this
case, since there is exactly the same demand for the amount of shares that the bank offers,
the share price will not drop. Another reason is that the parent bank might want to increase
its influence on the firm without expending its own capital. Finally, a bank might not want
to reach or exceed certain thresholds (e.g., 20%, 25% or 50%) because holdings above
these thresholds will trigger certain duties or have other unwanted consequences.
55 The
second and the last case presuppose, of course, that a parent bank is able to command the
votes of the shares that are held in an investment fund. The Investment Company Act
provides that the fund managers "shall" themselves vote the shares held by the fund in
regular cases.
56 According to the legal literature this does not, however, prohibit
management from giving the depositary bank a proxy by which the bank can vote these26
shares without having to disclose whose stock it votes.
57 That is also what happens in
practice.
58
Table 1 shows the shareholdings of banks and their investment fund subsidiaries in selected
stock corporations in 1994.28
Here again this picture is only preliminary. To get a more reliable overview it will be
necessary to look at several years, and, most importantly, to include the holdings of the so-
called special funds ("Spezialfonds") that are reserved for institutional investors. Another
serious drawback of this overview is that it is not yet possible to include holdings of banks
below the threshold of 20% as there are no reliable data so far.
59 Nevertheless the table
shows that in two cases (DBV Holding AG and Karstadt AG) the holdings of a bank
(Commerzbank) and its investment subsidiary (ADIG) surmounted the critical threshold of
25%. - The wish of a parent bank to increase its own voting power with the help of the
holdings of its subsidiary investment fund is apparently limited to these cases given that the
holdings of the funds make up only very small percentages. Finally, the table of course says
nothing about whether the shares held by the funds have been purchased from their parent
banks. Here again one needs the exact purchase dates, which are unknown.
What would be the appropriate reactions should further empirical research prove that
holding companies influence their investment company subsidiaries in all three instances
mentioned above?
Appropriate rules should be made to forbid the use of a subsidiary’s holdings to
circumvent laws tied to certain shareholding thresholds.
Buying shares from a parent company and exercising voting rights in the interest of the
parent company may damage the investors. As this cannot be perceived before the
conclusion of the investment contract, and monitoring of management by the investors or
by the depositary banks on behalf of the investors does not work, only three approaches
remain. The law could forbid buying shares from a holding company and voting stock in
firms in which other affiliated companies together hold a controlling block. Another way
would be to establish outside boards with independent representatives of the investors on it
who have to be asked for their consent in such cases. Finally, one could leave it to the
market to react. If a valuation of investment securities by the market (an exchange) did
exist, investment firms could deliberately adopt a policy not to buy or vote shares in the
interest of an affiliated company. Thus legal prohibition would be unneccessary if the
investment security is listed on the exchange.29
V. Interests of the parent bank’s management
Managements pursue their own interests. One of these interests is to protect themselves
against control. Control may be exerted by various stakeholders and in different ways. One
is control by the shareholders through voting. Can investment funds serve as a means to
protect the parent bank’s management against control by its shareholders? This issue
concerns predominantly those banks that are organized as stock corporations whose shares
are widely distributed among small shareholders. The following section will first try to
explain the corporate governance structure in such banks in a bit more detail (1.), then
look at the evidence (2.), and finally seek appropriate regulation (3.).
1. Corporate governance in large banks
Control in large stock corporations with widely distributed shares suffers from collective
action problems. The German answer to these problems was to allow banks to vote their
clients’ stock as proxies and thus take advantage of scale economies.
60 A bank may also
use proxies to vote those of its own shares that are held by customers of the bank provided
that these clients have specifically instructed the bank how to vote.
61 Hence in 1992,
Deutsche Bank’s management voted about 32% of all shares present at its own
shareholders’ meeting by proxies; Dresdner Bank’s management more than 44%, and
Commerzbank’s management more than 18% as table 2 below shows. Although the
shareholders who are asked for a proxy and an instruction tend to follow the
recommendations of management in most cases, control still remains in the shareholders’
hands. A way for management out of that would be to repurchase its own stock and vote it
at the shareholders’ meetings. This way, however, is barred under German law; the
management of a company may not vote the company’s own stock.
62
Another way could be to let the managers of a subsidiary investment company vote the
funds’ shares in the parent bank. Neither the Investment Company Act nor the Stock
Corporation Act prohibits an investment company from voting shares in its parent bank’s
general meeting. This is apparently another case where strict rules can be circumvented by
inserting an investment company.30
Yet still another way for management to control voting might be of interest here. As
table 2 below shows, banks also vote shares in their competitors’ general meetings to a
large extent. Hence managements of these banks can either support or punish each other to
a certain extent. This means that there is a strong disincentive working against monitoring
and controlling the other banks’ managements. This structure creates an implicit
management coalition against tight control by the shareholders of such banks. Here again
the shares held by a subsidiary investment company might contribute to the proxy holdings
of the parent bank itself and help to protect the parent bank’s management further against
effective control by its shareholders.
2. Investment funds and shares in parent banks
Is there evidence of the use of investment funds’ assets in the interests of the parent banks’
managements?
Table 2 displays the voting rights exercised by the five largest private banks at their own
and their competitors shareholders’ meetings in 1992.
Table 2: Voting rightsa of the five largest stock corporation banks at their 












 9 Deutsche Bank 32,07 14,14   3,03   2,75   2,83 54,82
11 Dresdner Bank   4,72 44,19   4,75   5,45   5,04 64,15
13 Commerzbank 13,43 16,35 18,49   3,78   3,65 55,70
15 Bayr. Vereinsb.   8,80 10,28   3,42 32,19   3,42 58,11
18 Bayr. Hypo.   5,90 10,19   5,72 10,74 23,87 56,42
a includes depositary voting rights and shares held by subsidiary investment funds/% of all shares
represented at the meeting.31
Source: Baums/Fraune, Institutionelle Anleger und Publikumsgesellschaft, Die Aktiengesellschaft
3/1995, at p. 106.
The table proves that managements of this top group together exercise the majority of the
votes present at the meetings. The numbers include depositary voting rights that are
exercised by a proxy given to the bank’s managements and shares held by subsidiary
investment funds.
Table 3 shows the percentage of shares that were voted by banks at the 1992 shareholders’
meetings of the 24 largest widely held stock corporations. These include the 3 biggest
German banks: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank. At Deutsche Bank’s
meeting, more than 82% of all shares present were voted by (all
63) banks, at Dresdner
Bank more than 83%, and at Commerzbank more than 81%. The corporations may not
vote their own shares.
64 At Deutsche Bank’s meeting, of the 82% more than 12% were
held by subsidiary investment companies (including Deutsche Bank’s investment
companies); at Dresdner Bank 7,72%, and at Commerzbank 15,84%. These shares were
voted exactly in line with the shares voted by proxies and the proposals of the bank’s
managements.
6532
Table 3: Voting rights
a exercised by banks in general meetings of the 24 largest widely
held stock corporations in 1992






1 Siemens 9,87 85,61 95,48
2 Volkswagen 8,89 35,16 44,05
3 Hoechst 10,74 87,72 98,46
4 BASF 0,09 13,61 81,01 94,71
5 Bayer 11,23 80,09 91,32
6 Thyssen 6,77 3,62 34,98 45,37
7 VEBA 12,62 78,23 90,85
8 Mannesmann 7,76 90,35 98,11
9 Deutsche Bank 12,41 82,32 94,73
10 MAN 8,67 12,69 26,84 48,20
11 Dresdner Bank 7,72 83,54 91,26
12 Preussag 40,65 4,51 54,30 99,46
13 Commerzbank 15,84 81,71 97,55
14 VIAG 10,92 7,43 30,75 49,10
15 Bayr. Vereinsbank 11,54 73,15 84,69
16 Degussa 13,65 8,65 38,35 60,65
17 AGIV 61,19 15,80 22,10 99,09
18 Bayr. Hypo 0,05 10,69 81,38 92,12
19 Linde 33,29 14,68 51,10 99,07
20 Deutsche Babcock 3,22 11,27 76,09 90,58
21 Schering 19,71 74,79 94,50
22 KHD 59,56 3,37 35,03 97,96
23 Bremer Vulkan 4,43 57,10 61,53
24 Strabag 74,45 3,62 21,21 99,28
average 13,02 10,11 60,95 84,09
a includes shares on own account, depositary voting rights as proxies and shares held by subsidiary
investment funds/% of all shares present at the meeting.
Source: Baums/Fraune, Institutionelle Anleger und Publikumsgesellschaft, Die Aktiengesellschaft 3/1995,
at p. 103.33
Figure 12 breaks these numbers down and shows (only) the shareholdings of subsidiary
"Publikumsfonds" in the big five private banks. Although these shareholdings in their
parent banks sum up to considerable amounts compared to the overall investments of such
companies (cf. fig. 12), they remain small in size compared to the parent bank’s own share
capital as shown in figure 13. Figure 12 is also interesting in that it shows no general
investment pattern of each subsidiary investing the highest amount in its parent bank’s
stock. Here again one will also have to look at the holdings of the "Spezialfonds" too as
these obviously
66 hold the bulk of the parent bank’s shares compared to the holdings of the
"Publikumsfonds". "Spezialfonds" are a form of investment fund that is available for
institutional investors only (including the parent banks themselves) as compared to the
"Publikumsfonds" with widely dispersed investors.36
Table 4 breaks down the aggregated data from figure 12 into the holdings of the single
subsidiary  "Publikumsfonds". As the dates of the general meetings of the parent banks do
not coincide with the dates when the reports of their subsidiary investment funds are
published, one cannot rely on the amount of shareholdings at these publication dates.
Hence the table shows also the maximum amount of the parent bank’s shares held by the
respective fund during two reporting dates.40
To sum up: subsidiary investment funds, publicly held funds as well as special funds, hold
shares in their parent banks to a considerable extent. These shares are either voted by the
fund managers themselves, or - predominantly - fund managers give a proxy to an
employee of the parent bank to vote these shares. In any event shares are voted according
to the proposals of the parent bank’s management. Subsidiary investment companies’
shares do also serve as a means to hold managements of other competing banks in check in
order not to leave their shareholdings and proxies too much room for control.
3. Regulatory reactions
The issue discussed in this section IV, like those discussed in the previous sections,
concerns not only the interests of the investors in an investment fund but also and
predominantly the interests of shareholders of the parent bank. The corporate governance
problems there should be solved by a regulation that forbids credit institutions to vote as
proxies except they have been given explicit instructions.
67 A subsidiary investment
company should also be forbidden to vote stock of a parent corporation.
V. Concluding remarks
The previous sections have analyzed one aspect of "universal banking", the combination of
banking and investment companies in one group. Four instances have been identified
where such a combination will affect either the investors or other constituencies such as
the shareholders of the banking institutions negatively if there are not appropriate legal and
regulatory provisions in place and/or market forces at work that exclude or diminish such
detrimental effects. It has also been argued that the legal and regulatory provisions of
German banking and investment company law are insufficient or even flawed. This,
however, has only been partially proved empirically so far. Further research will be
necessary.
Only recently the Social Democratic Party has introduced a bill that would, inter alia, bar
banks from founding and holding stock in investment companies.
68 The regulation of41
banking and the investment sector in the U.S. was held up as an example. I personally do
not think that the plan to cut any equity links between banks and investment companies is a
convincing and sufficient solution, as my remarks have shown. But the existing regulation
needs to be amended in various respects.42
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